26/09/2013 14:27
حقائق اون لاين-قسم الاخبار
انطلقت صباح اليوم الخميس 26 سبتمبر 2013 مسيرات شعبية و عمالية ضخمة بمشاركة قياديين بالاتحاد العام التونسي للشغل في عدد من الجهات الداخلية على غرار سليانة،الكاف،جندوبة و صفاقس و ذلك دعما لمبادرة الاطراف الراعية للحوار وبهدف الضغط على أحزاب الترويكا للقبول بخارطة الطريق المقترحة .
و جابت هذه المسيرات الشوارع الرئيسية للولايات رافعة شعارات منددة بتواصل سياسة ربح الوقت المتعمدة من جانب حركة النهضة و الرفض غير المبرر لاستقالة حكومة علي العريّض.
29 August 2013 Human Rights Watch Tunisian authorities should open prompt and thorough investigations into allegations of mistreatment in Mornaguia prison. The allegations were brought by two suspects detained under the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Mohamed Amine Guesmi, a suspect in the assassination of opposition leader Chokri Belaid, and Thameur Nassri, a 15-year-old boy detained for aiding terrorist networks in the Chaambi Mountains, filed complaints of mistreatment before judicial authorities on August 19 and 21, 2013, respectively. To date, the general prosecutor and the investigative judge have not officially opened an investigation into these allegations, nor have they ordered a medical examination of either prisoner to record physical evidence of abuse. “Even if the Tunisian authorities are under pressure over high-profile killings, they still can’t abuse suspects,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. Guesmi was arrested on February 21 and charged with complicity in the killing of Belaid, the leftist leader assassinated on February 6. Guesmi is suspected of driving the motorcycle on which the alleged assassin, Kamel Gadhgadhi, fled the crime scene after killing Belaid. Nassri was arrested on August 8 on suspicion of aiding a “terrorist” group hiding in the Chaambi Mountains, near Tunisia’s border with Algeria. On July 29, eight soldiers were killed, three of them mutilated, by a group that the authorities said was close to Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Since April 28, more than 16 members of the Tunisian security forces have been injured during counterterrorism operations in the region. Guesmi’s lawyer, Salha Ben Farah, told Human Rights Watch that she saw him on August 2 in Mornaguia prison. At the time of the visit, Guesmi bore no visible signs of mistreatment and was in good health. His wife, Hela Farah Guesmi, told Human Rights Watch that she visited her husband in prison on August 13 and that he was still in good health. When Ben Farah went to visit her client on August 16, the prison authorities told her he had been sent to a hospital for treatment, without disclosing the name of the hospital or the nature of his ailment. Farah told Human Rights Watch that she spoke with two of her other clients, Yasser Mouelhi and Mohamed Ali Dammak, also suspects in Belaid’s killing, who had been held in the same cell as Guesmi. They told her that the prison authorities had not brought Guesmi back to their cell since he left for his wife’s visit on August 13. The lawyer waited until 3 p.m., but Guesmi was not brought back to the prison. His family went to look for him in hospitals throughout the governorate of Tunis, but could not find him. On August 17, the general director of prisons, Habib Sboui, denied on Radio Mosaique that Guesmi had been subjected to mistreatment or that he had disappeared, and said that his family is welcome to come and visit him at any time. However, when his wife, accompanied by a Human Rights Watch researcher and two journalists, went to the prison to ask to see him, prison authorities denied them access, saying that they had to come during official visiting hours. Later that afternoon, Mohamed Ali, Guesmi’s brother, went to the prison to ask to see him, and this time the authorities authorized the visit. Mohamed Ali told Human Rights Watch: I was allowed to see him for only five minutes. I wanted to shake hands with him, but my brother couldn’t move his right arm, he was supporting it with his left arm. He had also dark marks around his wrists, seemingly from the handcuffs. Ben Farah told Human Rights Watch that she went with three other lawyers from the defense team to visit Guesmi on August 19. She too saw dark marks around his wrists, which she thinks resulted from the prolonged use of handcuffs. She said that Guesmi showed them bruises on his right arm that he said were from beatings. He told them prison guards put him in a punishment cell for five days and beat him. These accounts did not indicate the reasons for the beatings. Prison authorities told Guesmi’s lawyers that he had been put in a punitive isolation cell because he had behaved aggressively toward a guard. Law no. 2001-52 of May 14, 2001, concerning the organization of prisons, provides for progressive disciplinary measures for detainees who break the prison’s regulations. Article 22 states that prison authorities may decide as a disciplinary measure to “confine the detainee in an isolation cell equipped with the necessary sanitary facilities, after consulting the prison doctor, and for a period not exceeding ten days.” Under no circumstances could beatings and torture be justified as disciplinary measures. Ben Farah told Human Rights Watch that Guesmi’s defense team filed a complaint of torture against prison authorities before the investigative judge of the 13th bureau of the Tunis First Instance Tribunal, who is in charge of investigating Belaid’s killing. They also requested a medical examination of their client. They said that so far, the investigative judge has not ordered a medical examination and has not officially opened an investigation into the torture allegations. In the case of Nassri, Human Rights Watch has collected credible information about allegations of beatings and mistreatment. Neji Nassri, Thamer’s father, told Human Rights Watch that the National Guard arrested his son on August 8 and transferred him to Aouina, the National Guard headquarters in Tunis. When the father saw the son about a week later in the Mornaguia prison, Thamer told him he had been beaten and threatened with rape. Thamer Nassri’s lawyer, Rafik el Ghak, told Human Rights Watch that for security reasons, the juvenile judge decided to place his client in an individual cell on August 15. When el Ghak visited on August 16, he saw bruises on Nassri’s temples, and on his arms. Nassri told his lawyer that several prison agents had come in and out of the isolation cell, beating him and telling him, “You will see what we will do to you, you terrorist.” He told el Ghak that one of the guards lashed his arms with a hosepipe, and others kicked him on the legs with their boots and slapped his face. El Ghak said that on August 21 he filed a complaint to the prosecutor of the Manouba First Instance Tribunal, and requested an immediate medical examination for his client. However, the prosecutor has not yet ordered a medical examination or issued a formal request to open an investigation into the torture allegation. A forensic examination of torture victims at an early stage is critical for the effective investigation of torture and other ill-treatment and punishment. Delays in performing medical examinations undermine the record of physical evidence of abuse. Principle 2 of the United Nations Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Istanbul Protocol) requires States to “ensure that complaints and reports of torture or ill-treatment are promptly and effectively investigated.” Principle 6 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment states that, “No person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. No circumstance whatever may be invoked as a justification for torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Torture and other ill-treatment were rampant under former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who fled in January 2011. The UN special rapporteur on torture, who visited Tunisia in May 2011, noted ongoing torture and other ill-treatment. He highlighted the need for Tunisian authorities to conduct in-depth investigations of reports of torture and ill-treatment, to prosecute those responsible, and to give the victims access to effective remedies and reparation. Crucial for combating ill-treatment is a functioning system of independent and unannounced visits to monitor all places where persons are held when deprived of their liberty. Tunisia ratified the UN Convention against torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment on September 1988, and signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) on June 29, 2011. On November 11, 2012, the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice submitted a draft law to the NCA to create a national body responsible for independent monitoring of detention centers. However, the NCA has not yet ratified it. “Impunity for torture should be a relic of the old Tunisia,” Stork said. “In order to end abuse of prisoners, authorities should open investigations, hold people to account, and promptly establish a national preventative mechanism with the widest mandate to visit all places of detention.” Human Rights Watch, Tunisia: Investigate Alleged Abuse in Prison, 29 August 2013, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/522467504.html [accessed 15 September 2013]
AIM Newswire — September 6, 2013
WASHINGTON — Tunisia’s opposition threatens more widespread protests against the current Islamist government, led by the Ennahda party.
Reuters reported that the secular opposition are upset how slow the negotiations were going and say that the political stalemate will eventually end the Islamist government’s short rule.
The opposition, led by secular parties, are leading in the polls. The main issue is that there are about 12 different parties. But, the ruling Islamist Ennahda party is highly unpopular among Tunisians. This means that this will mark a second Arabic country who will push out an Islamist government, as Egypt did recently to Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood party.
The current Tunisian political stalemate is a result of two assassinations of top opposition lawmakers, where Tunisians immediately blamed the Ennahda party of coordinating. Ennahda denied any involvement and blamed al-Qaeda operatives operating in the desert and mountain regions of the country. But, it seems that the Tunisian public is not buying the Ennahda narrative.
“The textile industry is the second most important industry in Tunisia” Photographer Sophia Baraket
While the traditional outlets for men’s clothing – small-scale shops and tailors – may struggle financially today, they remain an inspiration for high-profile Tunisian designers whose creations grace the walkway of Tunis Fashion Week. Tunisian fashion designers invoke the spirit of their ancestors in designs that are both functional and stylish.
Chaker Bouajila, chargé de la communication à la présidence de la république, a confirmé pour Africanmanager, l’entrée hier soir de Moncef Marzouki à l’hôpital militaire, comme nous l’avions écrit depuis mercredi soir.
Bouajila a cependant précisé que le président provisoire, Moncef Marzouki, n’était entré que pour un simple contrôle médical de routine. Il a aussi expliquée l’admission tardive par son emploi de temps qui l’avait retenu tard l’après-midi, avec des personnalités qu’il recevait
African Manager http://www.africanmanager.com/155173.html
TUNIS (AFP) – The People’s Movement of slain Tunisian MP Mohamed Brahmi on Monday called for a weekend rally to mark 40 days since the opposition leader’s murder plunged the country into crisis.
Modern Ghana http://www.modernghana.com/news/340623/1/tunisia-opposition-calls-for-rally-to-mark-mps-mur.html
By Mounira M. Charrad and Amina Zarrugh on September 4, 2013
Women have been central to the events that have shaken Tunisian politics since the Arab Spring in 2010-11. They have played roles as protesters and politicians, activists and academics, journalists and photographers, and whether poor or privileged, urban or rural. Tunisia has long occupied an important position in the Arab world since the historic promulgation of its progressive family law in 1956, which placed the country at the forefront of the Arab world in regard to women’s rights (Charrad 2007). In an extensive comparative survey of Arab countries in 2009, Freedom House ranked Tunisia first in the major categories that concern women’s rights, including “autonomy, security, and freedom of person,” and “political and civic voice,” (Kerry & Breslin 2010).
In this article, we address two related questions. In the first section, we consider how Tunisia came to occupy a premier position in regard to women’s rights through the promulgation of its Code of Personal Status (CPS) in 1956, well known throughout the Arab world, and the continuous amendments to the CPS over a half-century since then. In the second section, we discuss some of the current debates on women’s rights in Tunisia following the Arab Spring, including the mobilization of women around the controversial Article 28 in the draft of the new constitution. By “women’s rights,” we mean women’s rights in the law as it concerns personal status and family law. We focus on this aspect of the law because family law is, as lawyer and human rights activist Asma Khadar (1996: 2) stated unambiguously, “the gate of freedom and human rights for women” in the Arab and broader Muslim worlds. Family law has significant implications for women’s lives, including their ability to make life choices freely and to pursue educational and professional opportunities.
Code of Personal Status: A Post-Colonial Expansion of Women’s Rights
Family law, which encompasses rules and regulations concerning marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance, continues to be the site of some of the most fundamental differences in women’s rights across the Middle East and North Africa. In Tunisia, the newly formed postcolonial state initiated reforms of family law following the country’s independence from France in 1956. This was an action from above, or a top down policy, which occurred in the absence of an organized women’s movement. As Charrad (2001: 219) has shown, the CPS was “not a response from the state to pressures from a women’s mass protest movement.” In promulgating the CPS, the government made decisions for the society as a whole without engaging the community or facilitating the perspectives of the citizenry through popular referendum or other channels of popular expression.
The reasons behind the promulgation of the Code in the 1950s are complex and a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Charrad (2001: 201-232; 2007; 2011) has argued elsewhere that the CPS was part and parcel of an overall strategy of state building that targeted patriarchal networks, clans, and tribal groups. At the same time as they promulgated the CPS, members of the postcolonial leadership also abolished collective property that had been key to tribal networks, created a new form of administration throughout the territory by ignoring tribal allegiances, and advanced a discourse that was unabashedly anti-tribal. An inherent part of the project to create a national state that stood above local, kinship, sect or community loyalties, reforms of personal status law aimed to generate a new form of citizenship in which individual allegiances went to the nation-state. Women benefitted from this conception of citizenship in that they gained individual rights before the law and thus were less subordinated to the whims of husbands and kin.
Tunisia’s new CPS introduced significant changes in family law such as the abolition of polygamy, the end of men’s privilege of unilateral repudiation as a way to terminate a marriage at will, the ability of a woman to file for divorce, and the enhancement of women’s custodial rights over children. Inheritance laws, for which there are strict and clear provisions in the text of the Qur’an itself and thus constitute an especially sensitive issue, remained the least modified legislation. These reforms, mediated by nationwide institutions and a national court system rather than local authority structures, provided state protections for women. Even though educated women were in a better position to take advantage of the law, much knowledge about the CPS percolated through different strata of society, giving Tunisian women at large the possibility of utilizing what the new laws had to offer.
Reforms beneficial to women continued during the regime of Zine El Abedine Ben Ali who paraded women’s rights as part of a general portrayal of Tunisia as embracing modernity on the international scene. The reforms again were largely a top down policy, although women’s rights advocates started to make their collective voice heard in defense of women’s issues in the 1980s. Their actions were severely restricted, however, as were those of other associations in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, women’s associations were composed of urban, elite women in Tunis whose interests were disproportionately represented in Ben Ali’s policy formulations to the relative exclusion of poor women (Khalil, forthcoming). Nevertheless, meaningful reforms occurred during that period. For example, as recently as in 2007, the minimum age of marriage was raised to 18 for both men and women, who could marry as early as 15 under the prior legislation (Charrad and Ha, forthcoming). Other reforms initiated under Ben Ali in the 2000s expanded women’s rights in regard to marriage contraction, alimony, and custodial rights over children.
A long history of top-down policy formulations concerning women’s rights in Tunisia was abruptly interrupted in 2011 when Tunisia witnessed the collapse of the Ben Ali regime and the engagement of multiple sectors of society, including Tunisian women from diverse socioeconomic and political backgrounds.
The “Jasmine Revolution”
On January 14, 2011, former President Ben Ali resigned from office following weeks of protest across Tunisia. The self-immolation of a twenty-six year old Tunisian vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi, on December 17, 2010, started the uprising in the rural district of Sidi Bouzid. Protests then engulfed larger cities in Tunisia, including the capital of Tunis. By early January 2011, mass demonstrations were being regularly held in the name of freedom, an end to corruption, and in demand of Ben Ali’s immediate departure from office. Popular media dubbed the ousting of Ben Ali, and the protests that preceded it, the “Jasmine Revolution” (Arieff 2011).
A resounding feature of the protests was the presence of women who demonstrated as professionals, students, and citizens. Women participated as organizers and demonstrators and, consequently, gender equality has been central to discussions of Tunisian politics, most eminently as it relates to elections and the drafting of the constitution (Beardsley 2011). In the case of the former, a quota to include women on party lists for the October 2011 National Constituent Assembly (NCA) election was instituted into law by the transitional government (Dasgupta and Bangham 2012). This measure, drafted and supported by Tunisian women’s civil society groups, attempted to enhance gender parity in representation though it was limited because the law did not specify how high on party lists women were to appear. Consequently, many parties ignored the spirit of the law by meeting the requirement to include women on party lists but offering them the lowest positions on the list (Associated Press 2011).
Regardless of their position on party lists, women were nevertheless successful candidates in elections and ascended to positions in the NCA in 2011. The Islamist party Ennahda acquired the largest number of seats in the assembly and boasted 42 female candidates of a total of 49 total women elected to the 217-member NCA (Byrne 2011). Ennahda Executive Council member Mounia Brahim emphasizes the mixed trajectories of Islamist women in politics by saying, “Look at us. We’re doctors, teachers, wives, mothers – sometimes our husbands agree with our politics, sometimes they don’t. But we’re here and we’re active” (Marks 2011). The election results and the Islamist women’s leadership call our attention to the diversity of women’s organizations, efforts, and affiliations. They should lead us to question the religion/secular binary as a lens by which to understand women’s interests and movements in Tunisia. The involvement of Islamist women in politics in Tunisia resonates with studies that show how women who identify with Islam regard it as a significant source of their political engagement and subjectivity in other parts of the Arab world (Deeb 2011; Mahmood 2005; Salime 2011).
Following Ennahda’s electoral victory in Tunisia, widespread concern was expressed about whether the power of parties not only sympathetic to but actively supportive of a more extensive role for religion in Tunisian jurisprudence might imperil the liberal legislation in place since the 1950s and enshrined in the CPS. There were tenable fears that Ennahda’s success at the polls in 2011 heralded a broader influence of religion in the country to establish what Hamad (2013) called “Tunistan,” or an Islamic state. The preeminent presence of women, particularly Islamist women, in the newly elected assembly profoundly shaped the tenor of debates about the constitution that was drafted over the course of the following 16 months. It has been in the context of the constitution drafting that we have witnessed a transformation of Tunisian politics from actions from above to a public debate about gender in which Tunisian women, Islamist and other, have been central figures.
Debates about Gender in the Constitution: Article 28
Heated debates in Tunisia regarding gender have concerned political representation and, most recently, references to women in the newly drafted constitution. The popularly elected NCA had as one of its mandates to draft a new constitution, drawing on elements from the preexisting 1959 constitution. The draft of the constitution became the site of struggle, popular outcry, and national dialogue in a way that signifies a restructuring of Tunisian politics and illustrates the significance of a burgeoning civil society. Article 28 entitled “Women’s Rights,” constituted one of the most debated and disputed articles in the first draft of the constitution, which was released on August 13, 2012. The article was generally translated as deeming women’s roles in the family as “complementary” to that of men (Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia 2012; emphasis added).
Although multiple translations may be offered to intimate the meaning of “yetekaamul,” the Arabic term in contention, the term “complementary” (or “complémentaires” in French) has been the most frequent translation. In response to the first draft released in August 2012, thousands of women organized protests in the capital city of Tunis with a twofold purpose: to celebrate the 56th anniversary of the promulgation of the esteemed CPS and to sharply contest the vocabulary of Article 28 (Ghanmi 2012). Opponents of the “complementary” clause of Article 28 argued that the clause defined women only in relation to men and, in addition, only recognized women as married, further negating the multiple and diverse lifestyles of Tunisian women. The use of the term “complementary” inflamed many.
Women associated with organizations such as the Democratic Women’s Association, La Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH), and L’Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développment (AFTURD), among others, pursued a variety of avenues to express their grievances with the article and to advocate for alternatives (Karam 2012). From demonstrations with dynamic slogans to the circulation of an online petition that acquired more than 30,000 signatures, women openly critiqued the draft and called for revisions to protect what many regarded as gains acquired during the post-colonial period (Avaaz 2012). Rights enshrined in the CPS became a reference and symbol of what could be threatened by the terminology of “complementarity.”
The range of Tunisian women’s activism was exhibited in turn by women supportive of Article 28. Islamist women, particularly Ennahda members in the NCA, voiced their support for the article. Some women argued that misunderstandings of the article prevailed in part through misrepresentation of its contents by opposition parties (Babnet 2012). Among the staunchest defenders of the article, Ennhada Executive Council member Farida Labidi declared that “One cannot speak of equality between man and woman in the absolute” (Cavaillès 2012). The multiple positions advocated by supporters and opponents of Article 28, and the nuanced conversations that ensued about the specific meanings of terms like “complementary” and “equality,” illustrate the ways in which women’s organizations and activists asserted themselves in debates in Tunisia during the post-revolutionary period in a way that departed significantly from top-down gender policy promulgation that prevailed in earlier eras (Charrad and Zarrugh, forthcoming).
As a sign of the efficacy of women’s organizing in Tunisia’s emergent civil society at this time, the “complementary” clause of Article 28 was omitted from the second and third drafts of the constitution released on December 12, 2012 and April 30, 2013, respectively. Ennahda made another concession in these latter drafts by excluding specific references to Shari’a law as the official and primary source of legislation in the country (Hamad 2013). In discussions of the final draft of the constitution, ambivalence continues to be expressed among opposition political figures who claim that articles still contain references to Islam as the state religion and limit freedom of expression (Al-Jalassy 2013). Until a final constitution is adopted, the status of women remains unclear. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that popular organizing, persistence, and an optimism about the possibilities for change encouraged both supporters and opponents of Article 28 to voice their positions not only to influence the reformulation of one of the country’s most foundational texts but also to articulate anew women’s status in contemporary Tunisia.
Conclusion
At the heart of this burgeoning civil society and activism following the Jasmine Revolution is the historical status of Tunisia as the bulwark of women’s rights in the region. Contemporary women’s rights discussions in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Muslim world cannot be understood outside the context of family law and personal status codes. In Tunisia, the liberal legislation of the post-colonial CPS continues to structure the arguments around women’s rights and status in the post-revolutionary constitution of Tunisia in 2013. A major shift has occurred, however, even though we do not know how long it will be felt. From the outset of the protests in Tunisia in December 2010, there has been a structural change in Tunisian politics, particularly as it relates to gender. The mass demonstrations that witnessed the extensive participation of Tunisian women were a preliminary sign of the transformations to come through their participation in popular elections, their ascension to political power, and the debates to which they contributed in regard to the drafting of the constitution and contentious discourse as reflected in Article 28.
Whether Tunisian women continue to participate in public debates and what will be the fate of women’s rights in the country in the years to come remain as questions. Although the door appears open to the possibility of Tunisia retaining its prominent place in the Arab world in regard to women’s rights, the opposite is also conceivable, depending on which political forces hold power in the state in the long run.
—
Mounira M. Charrad is Associate Professor of Sociology and Middle East Studies at the University of Texas in Austin. Her book, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (University of California Press, 2001), won several national awards, including the Distinguished Book Award from the American Sociological Association and the Best Book on Politics and History Greenstone Award from the American Political Science Association. Her articles on state formation, law, citizenship, kinship and gender have appeared in scholarly journals. She has edited Patrimonial Power in the Modern World with J. Adams (2011), Patrimonialism, Global History and Imperial Rule, with J. Adams (forthcoming), Women’s Agency: Silences and Voices (2010), and Femmes, Culture et Societe au Maghreb (1996). Her recent publications include: “Equal or Complementary? Women in the New Tunisian Constitution after the Arab Spring,” with A. Zarrugh, Journal of North African Studies, forthcoming; and “Gender in the Middle East: Islam, States, Agency,”Annual Review of Sociology, 2011. She received her undergraduate education from the Sorbonne in Paris and her Ph.D. from Harvard University.
Amina Zarrugh is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin. She has co-authored “Equal or Complementary? Women in the New Tunisian Constitution after the Arab Spring,” with M. M. Charrad, forthcoming in the Journal of North African Studies. Her research interests center on gender, nationalism, and religion in North Africa and the Middle East from a postcolonial perspective. Her dissertation focuses on regime violence in Libya and the mobilization of women in a family movement that developed in response to a contested prison massacre at Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli in 1996. She received her undergraduate education in sociology and government from the University of Texas at Austin.
References
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e-International Relations (www.e-IR.info) http://www.e-ir.info/2013/09/04/the-arab-spring-and-womens-rights-in-tunisia/
Me Charfeddine Kellil, l’avocat de la journaliste et blogueuse Olfa Riahi, a confirmé mardi 03 septembre au micro de Wassim Ben Larbi lors de l’émission Expresso, l’avancement des enquêtes concernant l’affaire Sheraton Gate.
أمنستي ” تتجول “
(c) Amnesty Tunisia
تعتزم مجموعة الضاحية الشمالية لتونس تنظيم سلسلة من التظاهرات كل 15 يوم خلال الفترة الممتدة من 7 سبتمبر إلى 31 ديسمبر 2013 تحت عنوان ” امنستي تتجول ” و ذلك بهدف:
– التعريف بمنظمة العفو الدولية لعموم متساكني المنطقة،
– التحرك و جمع الامضاءات فيما يخص دسترة حقوق الانسان في الدستور التونسي المرتقب،
– جمع الامضاءات فيما يخص بعض التحركات العاجلة.
هذا و تنتظم التظاهرة الاولى يوم السبت 7 سبتمبر 2013 بمنطقة سيدي بو سعيد من الساعة السادسة مساء إلى الساعة التاسعة مساء. و ذلك في المنطقة الواقعة مقابل مقهى الرفرافي و مقابل جامع الغفران أي على ممشى المارة.
مجموعة الضاحية الشمالية لتونس تدعو كافة أعضاء المنظمة للمشاركة في نشر ثقافة حقوق الانسان. انشروها و لكم الأجر
Kama`ole Beach Maui Hawai`i
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